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The problem of Shadwell v. Shadwell' has recently come before
the New York Court of Appeals in the case of Attilio De Cicco v.
Schweizer.2 The facts of the two cases have much similarity. In
the New York case a written document was prepared containing the
following:
"Whereas, Miss Blanche Schweizer, daughter of Joseph Schweizer
. . . is now ffiianced to and is to be married to Count Oberto Gulinelli.
Now, in consideration of all that is herein set forth, the said Joseph
Schweizer promises . . . to pay annually to his said daughter
Blanche . . . the sum of two thousand five hundred dollars."
This was delivered to the count, and four days later the marriage
took place. For ten years the payment was made, -and the present suit
was brought to recover the eleventh annual instalment. The plaintiff
sues as assignee of both the daughter Blanche and her husband. The
court holds that there was sufficient consideration for the defendant's
promise, thus agreeing with Shadwell v. Shadwell.
Some of the inferior courts of New York have failed to recognize
the general distinctions between bilateral and unilateral contracts,
speaking of the latter as if they were not contracts at all but were
mere unenforceable unilateral promises, void for want of acceptance
and consideration. In the present case the Court of Appeals makes
no such mistake. The contract is plainly described as "unilateral,"
and the defendant's promise is enforced because the acts of acceptance
constituted a sufficient consideration. Neither the count nor the
defendant's daughter made any promise, and the court assumes that
the contract became binding upon the defendant only when the mar-
riage was celebrated.
This decision deserves extended comment because the opinion by
Mr. Justice Cardozo shows a clear understanding of a unilateral con-
tract and familiarity with the best literature on the subject in both
books and periodicals, because the decision is correct in principle and
in policy, and because it very probably will be a starting point in the
reversal of a large number of decisions and in the abandonment of a
± (i86o) 9 C. B. N. S. 159, 30 L. J. C. P. 145.
2 (97, N. Y.) 117 N. E. 8o7.
'See Meade v. Poppenberg (1915) 167 App. Div. 411, 153 N. Y. Supp. 182;
Fisk v. Batterson (1914) I65 App. Div. 952, 15o N. Y. Supp. 242.
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rule now generally prevailing in the United States. In some matters
of detail the reasoning of the court will be criticised herein; but this
must not be regarded as in any way intimating unsoundness in the
decision, and in spite of such possible differences the opinion is one to
be received with grateful appreciation.
It will not be denied in this article that when A has contracted with
B for a certain performance, this creates a specific duty in A, A duty
is a legal relation that exists whenever certain action or forbearance
is expected of an individual, and in default of it the representatives
of organized society will act in some predetermined manner injurious
to the defaulting individual. In any case there is a possibility that this
societal action will not in fact take place; for the default may not be
discovered, or no one may care to start a proceeding against" the
defaulter, or he may by evasion or by force prevent any action. This
possibility exists in the case of a secondary duty to pay damages or to
make restitution, as well as in the case of a primary duty to perform
specifically. Such a possibility, therefore, does not prove the non-
existence of a duty in a particular case, for it is to be found in all
cases.
Furthermore, A's duty is not in the alternative, to perform or to pay
damages. The term duty describes one of the primary legal relations,
existing from the moment a contract is made. With the occurrence
of each subsequent operative fact, the existing legal relations change.
One of this new group may be a duty to pay damages. This is a new
legal relation, a secondary duty. If the fact that new legal relations
follow each new operative fact justifies our calling the original duty
an alternative duty, it justifies our calling the secondary duty to pay
damages an alternative duty. Suppose a judgment for damages is
given by a court; still the debtor does not have to 15ay. What will
society do about it? In former times, the debtor would have been
imprisoned. Was it then the duty of the contractor to perform or to
pay damages or to lie in jail? To-day, the court will merely issue
a writ of execution commanding the sheriff to seize goods of the
debtor. If there are none to seize, there is little else that can be done.
In such a case, it would then appear to be the contractor's duty to
perform or to pay damages or to do nothing at all. If the sheriff finds
goods and takes them, the duty of the contractor is merely the nega-
tive one not to interfere with possession and enjoyment. Thus his
original duty appears to be either (i) to perform specifically, or (2)
to pay damages, or (3) to forbear to interfere after his goods are
seized, or (4) to pay .damages for interfering, etc., ad infinitum.
Duties change as new facts arise, but this does not justify the descrip-
tion of any particular duty as an alternative one.-
' See comment by W. T. Barbour, The "Right" to Break a Contract (1917)
16 MicH. L. RFv. io6; also comment by the present writer, Part Payment of a
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The present decision, therefore, should not be justified by asserting
that the daughter and her husband were under no duty to marry.
Each was under such a duty to the other. It serves no useful purpose
and may do positive harm to say that they were merely under the
alternative duty to marry or to pay damages. The duty to pay dam-
ages may also be shown to be merely one of several alternatives. It is
equally as justifiable to say that the duty of the count after marriage
is to be faithful to Blanche or to pay alimony.
In the case now under discussion the court makes an effort to dis-
tinguish previous New York decisions5 on the ground that they were
cases of "a promise by A to B to induce him not to break his contract
with C," whereas this is a case of "a promise by A, not merely to B,
but to B and C jointly, to induce them not to rescind or modify a
contract which they are free to abandon." Such a distinction would
seem to require an assumption that if the defendant offered his promise
to both the count and the daughter instead of to the count alone, this
in some way causes it to be no longer the duty of each to carry out
the engagement contract. They are said to be "free to abandon,"
seeming to mean thereby that their marriage is no longer the per-
formance of a pre-existing duty in each. This line of reasoning, it is
submitted, is inaccurate.
In the first place the court is not entirely convincing in its effort
to show that the defendant made his offer to the daughter as well as
to the count, thus creating the relation commonly described as "privity."
Either Blanche was a promisee or she was not one. This is to be
determined, not by her subsequent action in reliance upon her father's
promise to the count, but by the expressions used by the father. If
she reasonably understood from what he said that the offer was to
her as well as to the count, and that the power of acceptance was being
intentionally conferred upon her, then she is a promisee. If she did
not reasonably understand so, then it is hardly correct to say that
"action on the faith of it put her in the same position as if she had
been in form the promisee." The principle applicable here is identical
whether the offer confers a power to make a unilateral contract or to
make a bilateral one. The question whether the power to accept was
conferred upon one person or upon two persons jointly is one of fact
simply. This offer may well have been made to the count alone, and
the fact that his power of acceptance was dependent upon his being
able to induce Blanche to say yes at the wedding does not make the
offer an offer to Blanche. It seems highly probable that the defend-
Debt as Consideration for a Promise (i9o8) 17 YALE LAW Jo~nuRAL 470. A case
adopting this erroneous conception of contractual duty is Frye v. Hubbell (19o7)
74 N. H. 358.
5Arend v. Smith (1897) 151 N. Y. 502; Robinson v. Jewett (1889) I6 N. Y.
4o; Seybolt v. New York, etc. R. R. Co. (1884) 95 N. Y. 562; Vanderbilt v.
Schreyer (1883) 91 N. Y. 39z
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ant's promise in this case was to the count alone, and that the daughter
was merely a donee-beneficiary. The court itself says: "though the
promise ran to the count, it was intended for the benefit of the
daughter." As such donee-beneficiary, the daughter would clearly have
an enforceable right in nearly all of our states;' but this does not
make her a promisee and does not make her act a consideration for
the defendant's promise.
But if we suppose the offer to have been to the count and Blanche
jointly, their marriage in acceptance of the defendant's offer was
nevertheless the performance on the part of each of them of an exist-
ing duty to the other. Neither one of them was at any instant "free
to abandon" the engagement. The fact that the offer is to them both,
and that the acceptance must consist of their joint action, does not
cause their physical bodies to become one, nor should it, cause us to
imagine the existence of some fictitious legal personality, a quasi-
corporation. Each still owes a duty to the other, even in the (fre-
quently blind) "eye of the law." Neither one was privileged to break
the engagement. Neither one was privileged not to marry, and would
not become so privileged unless and until the consent of the other
should be given. Non constat that such consent had been or could be
obtained. The fact that each was willing to marry and thus to accept
the father's offer is far from showing that in the absence of the
father's offer either one would have been willing to rescind or modify
their contract. The unity of husband and wife was the merest fiction;
the notion was often productive of harm, and it no longer prevails to
its former extent. The fiction of unity between joint contractors is
also one that should not be indulged. Therefore, it serves no purpose
to say that they were "free to abandon" their engagement, if at the
same time we are bound to admit that neither one was free to abandon
it. The fact that the father made an offer to both of them has no
effect whatever upon their individual duties to each other. For our
present purpose, their legal relations are the same as in a case where
A has made a promise to B and C,-B being under a duty to X, and
C being under a duty to Y. Very different would their legal relations
have been if, at the time of the defendant's offer, the count and
Blanche had not yet become engaged or had mutually rescinded their
engagement. Then, indeed, they would have been "free" not to
marry.7
'No doubt it would now be so held in New York. Buchanan v. Tilden (1899)
158 N. Y. iog; Pond v. New Rochelle W. Co. (i9o6) 183 N. Y. 330. The doc-
trines of Buchanan v. Tilden were wholly disregarded in the earlier case of
Durnherr v. Rau (1892) 135 N. Y. 29, and the two cases are reconcilable only
with great difficulty. The present case of DeCicco v. Schweizer must be
regarded as confirming Buchanan v. Tilden.
" These two cases put for contrast and comparison were suggested by my
colleague, Professor Hohfeld, whose analysis and definition of jural relations
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If the foregoing argument is sound, the case stands just as it would
if the defendant's promise had been to the count alone, the only con-
sideration being the performance of the count's legal duty to Blanche.
He was under this duty, and he was not free to abandon it or privileged
not to marry. Blanche owed the same duty and lacked the same
privilege. Each, it is true, had the power to offer a rescission-a rela-
tion of value, however uncertain it might be whether the other would
exercise the power of rescission thereby conferred. Each one had this
valuable power eveft though the defendant's promise was made to the
count alone. This is of importance and will be discussed below.
Assuming, then, that the only consideration given by the count was
the performance of acts which his existing duty to Blanche required,
and that the only consideration given by Blanche was the performance
of similar acts which her existing duty to the count required, is there
any good reason why this should not be held a sufficient consideration
and cause for the enforcement of the father's promise? It is submitted
that there is none and that such performance fulfils the usual require-
ments as to consideration. Let us now consider these usual
requirements.
CONSIDERATION AS AN INDUCING CAUSE
Where the new promise of C has been offered by him in rettrn for
the actual performance by A of his previous contract with B, the
requested performance is certainly the object of C's desire and is,
in this sense, the conventional inducement of C's promise. Likewise,
the promise of C is one of the inducing causes of A's performance
and is the conventional equivalent therefor. The fact that A had other
inducements which might or might not have been sufficient in them-
selves to cause him to perform, is not material so far as the doctrine
of consideration is concerned. The causes and motives of human
action are always complex. The law does not define consideration
as the sole inducing cause of a contractor's action, and if it were so
defined a valid contract would seldom be made. Insofar, then, as the
law requires consideration to be an agreed equivalent and a conven-
tional inducement, the performance by A fulfils the requirement.,
In DeCicco v. Schweizer it is, perhaps, not entirely certain that the
marriage ceremony of the count and the daughter was performed by
them as the requested equivalent and conventional inducement of the
have been of the greatest service in the solution of complex problems. See his
articles on Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning
(IM93) 23 YALE LAW JOURNAL 16; (1917) 26 ibid. 71o. The writer is also
indebted to Professor Hohfeld for much valuable criticism.
'The term "inducing cause" is here used merely to describe the object of
desire. The antecedent fact causing the defendant to make his promise is the
defendant's subjective desire itself.
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defendant's promise. The signed document merely recites the
approaching event as a preamble to the promise.
"Whereas, Miss Blanche . . . is now affianced to and is to be
married to Count Oberto Gulinelli. Now, in consideration of all that
is herein set forth, the said Joseph Schweizer promises . . . to
pay," etc.
This is not a direct statement that the act of marriage is to be the
consideration for the promise. The preamble merely recites the
engagement contract. It appears to be merely in contemplation of
that fact and because of the pleasure afforded by that fact to the
defendant that he makes the promise. He delivers the document as
a sort of antenuptial gift and as a provision for his daughter's future
support. As to this the court says:
"If they forbore from exercising that right and assumed the respon-
sibilities of marriage in reliance on the defendant's promise, he may
not now retract it. . . . If pressure, applied to both, and holding both
to their course, is not the purpose of the promise, it is at least the
natural tendency and the probable result. The defendant knew that
a man and a woman were assuming the responsibilities of wedlock
in the belief that adequate provision had been made for the woman
and for future offspring. He offered this inducement to both while
they were free to retract or to delay. That they neither retracted
nor delayed is certain. It is not to be expected that they should lay
bare all the motives and promptings, some avowed and conscious,
others perhaps half-conscious and inarticulate, which swayed their
conduct. It is enough that the natural consequence of the defendant's
promise was to induce them to put the thought of rescission or delay
aside."
It will be observed that- in the foregoing the court expresses the
opinion that the promise of the defendant was one of the inducing
causes of the marriage, although not the sole inducing cause; but
it does not consider whether the marriage was the inducing cause
of defendant's promise. It would appear from this that, in the court's
mind, consideration need not be the object of the promisor's desire for
which he expressly "offers his promise in exchange; but that, instead,
it may be merely action or forbearance by the promisee as the result
or natural consequence of the promise. Mr. Justice Holmes has
recognized the possibility of this, though apparently without approval.
"Of course the mere fact that a promisee relies upon a promise
made without other consideration does not impart validity to what
before was void. There must be some ground for saying that the
acts done in reliance upon the promise were .contemplated by the form
of the transaction either impliedly or in terms as the conventional
inducement, motive, and equivalent for the promise. But courts have
gone very great lengths in discovering the implication of such an
equivalence, sometimes perhaps having found it in matters which would
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seem to be no more than conditions or natural consequences of the
promise.""
Two years later, in the United States Supreme Court, he said:
"But the other elements are that the promise and the detriment are
the conventional inducements each for the other. No matter what
the actual motive may have been, by the express or implied terms of
the supposed contract, the promise and the consideration must pur-
port to be the motive each for the other, in whole or at least in part.
It is not enough that the promise induces the detriment or that the
detriment induces the promise if the other half is wanting."1 0
There are altogether too many decisions enforcing a promise where
the only consideration was some expected action in reliance upon it
for us to adopt without reserve the statement last quoted from Mr.
Justice Holmes. The previous statement quoted is considerably more
guarded and accords more nearly with prevailing applications of the
law. DeCicco v. Schweizer therefore should not be disapproved on
this ground. Moreover, the wording of the written document is not
so definite and certain in meaning as to exclude extrinsic data indicat-
ing that the marriage was in fact the intended equivalent and actual
inducement of the defendant's promise.
CONSIDERATION AS A BENEFIT TO THE PROMISOR
The" commonest of all definitions of consideration requires that it
shall be either a detriment to the promisee or a benefit to the promisor.
In view of the fact that this definition is being constantly approved
by the courts, expressed as it is in the alternative form, it should not
be disapproved on any merely a priori ground or even for the purpose
of justifying some historical hypothesis as to the origin of considera-
tion. Recent writers have been willing to admit that a benefit to a
promisor may be a sufficient consideration even in the absence of any
detriment to the promisee.11 In the case now under discussion it is
'Martin v. Meles (igoi) 179 Mass. 114. This case in itself goes far to justify
the statement contained in the last sentence of the quotation.
"0 Wisconsin & Mich. R. R. Co. v. Powers (i9O3) 191 U. S. 379, 386. This is
quoted and approved by Mr. Justice McKenna in Banning Co. v. California
(1915) 240 U. S. 142, 153. In 2 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability (i9o6)
81, it is said:
"Between the consideration and the promise there must be a causal relation.
The consideration must draw the promise from the promisor, and the promise
must be the inducement which causes the promisee to incur the detriment which
constitutes the consideration."
Samuel Williston, Consideration in Bilateral Contracts (1914) 27 H~Av. L.
REV. 518, 524; Edmund M. Morgan, Benefit to the Promisor as Consideration
(1917) i MiIN. L. REV. 383. A decision clearly in agreement is Union Bank v.
Sullivan (1915) 214 N. Y. 332.
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perfectly dear that the performance by Count Gulinelli was of some
benefit to the defendant. Mr. Schweizer received all those benefits
that are to be derived from alliance with a noble Italian family. Such
an alliance carries with it social prestige, even though some not enjoy-
ing such an alliance may be inclined to scoff. This social prestige
means power to influence the action of others in business affairs as
well as in social life. The action of the count has money value, and
the fact that this value cannot be determined with certainty is not
material. The same can be said of many other matters the sufficiency
of which as a consideration is not questioned, as, for example, a
forbearance to compete in business or a forbearance to press a
doubtful claim.
The existence of actual benefit to C from the performance by A
is well shown in McDevitt v. Stokes, recently decided by the Kentucky
Court of Appeals.1 2  Here, the defendant (C) promised the driver
(A) of a race horse owned by B that, in return for his driving in an
important race, he would receive $i,ooo if he won the race. A was
already under contract with B to drive the horse in this race.
13 He
drove with skill and was the winner. The defendant was the owner of
the sire, the dam, and two full brothers of the horse to be driven by A.
As such owner, he received a prize of $300 from the racing associa-
tion; and, in addition, the value of the four horses owned by him was
increased by $25,000, this fact being admitted by demurrer. The act
of A in driving with skill was certainly one of the causes of C's
increase in wealth. The act was therefore a benefit to C., As to the
$3o0, C received new property rights. As to the $25,000, he received
no new rights, powers, or privileges; and yet he received benefit. The
winning of the race whetted the appetites of others for the horses
already owned by C.
In McDevitt v. Stokes the court does not deny the existence of the
above benefit, nor does it attack the definition of consideration as being
either a detriment to the promisee or a benefit to the promisor; but
(1917, Ky.) 192 S. W. 68i. This case follows the prevailing rule that the
promise of C cannot be enforced. The reasons upon which it is based are
believed to be quite erroneous.
" If in such a case A does at C's request any act not previously required by his
contract with B, this is a sufficient consideration for C's promise. Such is not
the case now under discussion. It may, indeed, be argued that A's duty to B
is to do acts that are normally commensurate with the size of the promised
reward, and that when C offers a larger reward A will necessarily be stimulated
to make even greater efforts. This is certainly the view of the practical man,
for that is why C offers a new reward. Stokes promised McDevitt $r,ooo, not
because he feared a breach by McDevitt of his previous contract with B, but in
order to stimulate him to greater effort and to greater skill. Everyone knows
that a man can and will do more in return for $2,000 than for $i,ooo. McDevitt
owed to B only such skill and effort as the agreed salary normally induces.
Stokes's new promise enabled both B and himself to obtain a considerably
greater degree of skill and effort
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it quotes certain authors1 4 to the effect that by detriment and benefit
is meant "legal detriment" and "legal benefit" and not mere financial
detriment and benefit. It may not be an easy matter to determine
with exactness the boundaries of the field properly described by the
word benefit; but on the other hand it adds nothing to the definition
to substitute for it the term ""legal benefit." This indicates only that
there may be certain benefits that are not a sufficient consideration, but
gives no criterion for determining what they are. The court asserts
that the benefit in this case is not sufficient because A's performance
as legally required of him by his contract with B would inevitably
have resulted in the benefit received by C, even though C had made
no promise to the plaintiff. The statement as made is not necessarily
true ;1r5 but even if true, it does not show that the defendant did not
receive a benefit in fact in return for his promise. If the defendant's
promise was one of the inducing causes of the plaintiff's action, it is
wholly impossible now to determine whether the plaintiff would have
driven in the race at all without it or whether the race would have
been won.
CONSIDERATION AS A DETRIMENT TO THE PROMISEE
No one now doubts that a detrimental act or forbearance by the
promisee is a sufficient consideration, provided it was an agreed equiv-
alent--one of the conventional inducing causes of the promise. There
are many cases holding that such a detriment may be sufficient cause
for the enforcement of a promise, even though it was wholly ante-
cedent to the promise, or was subsequent thereto and a mere natural
consequence of the promise. The present New York case should
probably be included among these. The next question that must be
determined, however, is whether performance by A of an act required
by his duty to B is a detriment. There can be no doubt that it is in
fact a detriment from both the practical and theoretical standpoints.
A's performance of this duty requires the expenditure of time,
strength and money. In McDevitt v. Stokes the plaintiff refrained
from doing other things, he bore a considerable physical strain, and
he risked bodily injury. In DeCicco v. Schweizer the count assumed
all the marital relations by performing a ceremony that in itself can-
not be contemplated without emotion. In both cases there were
accompanying benefits. There are pleasure and physical stimulus in
driving a racehorse. There are happiness and new valuable rights in
marriage. In no case, however, does the law make an estimate of
the comparative values of these detriments and benefits. It does not
"'E. g., Page, Contracts (1905) sec. 274.
' See note 13, supra. Pollock admits that A's performance is a benefit to C,
but denies that it is a detriment to A. Wald's Pollock, Contracts (Williston's ed.
z9o6) 206.
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require a showing of a net loss in order to satisfy the requirement
of consideration. Nor does the law require a showing that the per-
formance now set up as a consideration was more detrimental than
any other possible alternative line of action. If the count had failed
to perform his duty to Blanche he might have been sued for breach
of promise. It cannot now be determined whether or not she would
have sued, nor can it now be determined whether or not such a suit
would have damaged the count more than the marriage has damaged
him. Forbearance to go to France is a sufficient consideration in spite
of the fact that actually going might involve mutilation or death.
It is true that in performing such acts as are required by his pre-
existing duty, A does not surrender any right, privilege, or immunity.
In other words, he has not assumed any no-right, duty, or liability.Y
1
Not only does he retain all of his old rights, privileges, and immunities,
during the course of his performance and after its completion, but,
also, he has gained some new ones, e. g., the right to compensation
from B. Instead of becoming burdened with new duties, he has dis-
charged one that previously weighed upon him. For these reasons
it is sometimes said that A's performance of his previous duty cannot
be detrimental to him.
It happens, however, that prior to his performance A had certain
valuable powers; and that after his performance they are extinguished.
He had the power to break the contract with B, thereby creating in
B new rights and privileges and at the same time preventing B from
having the rights and privileges that performance would have given
him. Thus, the count's breach of promise would have prevented
Blanche from having a right of dower, although she would have a
right to damages. She would still have the power to contract as a
feme sole, but she would have no power to bind the count to pay
millinery bills. It must be admitted that this power of the count is
one that he was not privileged to exercise (although the courts spir-
itual no longer attempt to enforce his duty by a decree for specific
performance). Nevertheless, the power in itself, even when unaccom-
panied by privilege, is of value to its possessor. If not, why does the
engaged youth ever prefer a breach of promise suit and a new sweet-
heart to wedding bells with possible future alimony?
There is another valuable power possessed by A that is effectively
extinguished by his full performance of the acts required by his duty
to B, one that he is legally privileged to exercise. This is the power
to offer a rescission to B. This is not a power to rescind; neither
party to the contract has such a power. It is a power to create in B
the power to rescind by accepting A's offer of rescission. Of course,
it cannot be determined now whether or not B would have accepted;
"For an explanation of this terminology see the articles by Professor Hohfeld,
cited in note 7, supra.
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but the probability of B's accepting affects merely the value of A's
power to make the offer. In any case, B might accept; and this
possibility gives some value to A's power.1 7  After full performance
by A, if he says to B "let us rescind," his words are void of legal
effect. A still has power to discharge B, if B has not yet performed
his part; but he cannot confer upon B the power to discharge A.
The relation is now a valueless disability in place of a valuable power.1 s
In DeCicco v. Schweizer, indeed, B has fully performed as well as A.
They are man and wife and neither has the power to release or to
make an effective offer of release.
It appears, therefore, that performance of a contractual duty owed
to a third person satisfies the usual requirements of the law as to
consideration. It is a benefit to the new promisor, C; it is a detri-
ment to the one so performing, A; it is the conventional inducement
and equivalent of C's act. Is there any imperious principle of public
policy that forbids the courts to recognize it as sufficient and to enforce
C's promise?
ARGUMENTS BASED UPON PUBLIC POLICY
It is perhaps generally believed that a rule approving as a sufficient
consideration either a performance in accordance with a pre-existing
duty, or the promise of such a performance, would operate to encour-
age the non-fulfillment of duties and the making of threats of non-
fulfillment. Thus, it is conceivable that if policemen are allowed to
enforce payment of a reward offered for the performance of official
duty, or for promises of such performance, they will be tempted to
postpone the performance of duty until some additional reward is
offered. So too an unscrupulous contractor might threaten to break
his contract or might improperly postpone performance for the purpose
of inducing an offer of a greater compensation. If this general wel-
fare argument is sound it justifies the prevailing American decisions,
and it applies equally to bilateral and to unilateral contracts.
It must be admitted that the above argument has some weight. No
' In DeCicco v. Schweizer Judge Cardozo asserts that the probability of accept-
ance by B of the offer to rescind is exceptionally high in engagements to marry.
This is probably true, except in the case of the adventuress; but it is also im-
material, because it goes only to the question of adequacy of consideration.
s It is not at all uncommon for legal theorists to say that consideration must
always involve the surrender of some legal right. No doubt the term "right"
is here used in an ambiguous sense; but the statement is altogether unsound for
other reasons. Without attempting a complete definition, it may be pointed out
that an act whereby a promisee surrenders a legal privilege or a legal power or a
legal immunity will serve as well as one whereby a legal right is surrendered.
In addition, many acts will serve as consideration when in themselves they create
no new legal relations whatever. An exercise of simple phy.ical power will
serve, even though close analysis shows that the actor gave up no right, privi-
lege, power, or immunity. The same is true of a simple forbearance to act.
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doubt it should be regarded as conclusive in cases of policemen and
other officials with public duties.19 It would have much weight, also,
in cases where the pre-existing duty was a contractual one and was a
duty owed by the promisee to the present promisor.
20  There may be
some danger that dishonest contractors will attempt to blackmail the
other party to the contract into promising a higher compensation.
There is far less danger, however, that such blackmailing efforts will
be directed against third persons who are strangers to the contract;
and even where there was such a conscious and successful effort, it is
much more difficult to see that anyone is wronged. Of course, if the
effort to get a promise of compensation from a third party results
in a breach of the pre-existing duty to a second party, this is a wrong
not to be encouraged.
It would not be particularly difficult to classify cases of this sort
along strictly moral lines, to separate the sheep from the goats, and
to enforce the new promise in favor of an honest contractor while
refusing to enforce it in favor of the blackmailer or the dishonest.
There is reason to believe that a considerable part of the apparent
conflict in the decisions can be explained on this ground. Such a dis-
tinction could not often be made in cases of public officials where the
non-fulfillment of the pre-existing duty would be a tort or other public
injury; and yet there are some cases holding that public officers can
collect promised extra rewards. The distinction can often be drawn
very properly in cases where there are only two parties involved and
the previous duty was owed to the present promisor.
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The distinction is very easily drawn in cases like the present one
"Pool v. Boston (1849, Mass.) 5 Cush. 219; Stamper v. Temple (1845, Tenn.)
6 Humph. 113.
I'Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewing Co. (18go) 103 Mo. 578; Stilk v.
Myrick (18o9) 2 Campb. 317.
n Thus, in Munroe v. Perkins (i83o, Mass.) 9 Pick. 298, the plaintiff had done
his best and had reached a point ,where his lack of credit was preventing further
performance. It is not too much to say that the moral sense of the community
would be shocked by allowing the defendant to break his new promise. On the
other hand, in Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewing Co. (i8go) 103 Mo. 578, the
promise was extorted from the defendant by threats and other inexcusable con-
duct. This distinction seems to be adopted in effect in King v. Duluth & M. Ry.
Co. (i895) 6i Minn. 482, in the following dictum:
"But where the party refusing to complete his. contract does so by reason of
some unforeseen and substantial difficulties in the performance of the contract,
which were not known or anticipated by the parties when the contract was
entered into, and which cast upon him the additional burden not contemplated by
the parties, and the opposite party promises him extra pay or benefits if he will
complete his contract, and he so promises, the promise to pay is supported by a
valid consideration."
This distinction is approved by Brantly, Contracts (2d ed. i912) sec. 4o; by
H. W. Ballantine, Doctrine of Consideration (913) ii MICH. L. REV. 434; by
the present writer, Part Payment of a Debt as Consideration for a Promise
(i9o8) 17 YALE LAw JO RNAL 470; and in Linz v. Schuck (1907) io6 Md. 22o.
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where the previous duty was -a contractual duty to a third person.
Indeed, it is believed that a great number of such cases would fall
on the enforceable side, and the sheep would be far more numerous
than the goats. In very many of these cases it would be shocking to
the conscience and in conflict with the prevailing mores of society to
refuse to enforce the new promise.2
CONSIDERATION IN BILATERAL CONTRACTS
Neither the case of DeCicco v. Schweizer nor the case of McDevitt
v. Stokes requires a discussion of the law as to bilateral contracts, but
a brief discussion may be of service. This will be limited to cases
similar to DeCicco v. Schweizer, except that the consideration for the
defendant's promise is not merely a performance in accordance with
the plaintiff's pre-existing contractual duty to a third person, but is
a promise of such performance. A few of the writers, and perhaps
one court, have made a distinction in these cases between unilateral
contracts and bilateral contracts.2 3 They assert that where A merely
performs as required by his duty to B in return for a new promise by
C, the consideration for C's promise is not sufficient; but that where
A makes a new promise to C of such a performance, the consideration
for C's promise is sufficient. They would enforce a bilateral agreement
anti refuse to enforce a unilateral one.
In cases actually decided, the courts are practically unanimous in
making no such distinction. They either enforce both classes of con-
tracts (as in England) or refuse to enforce either. The latter is the
generally prevailing rule in the United States. This being true, if
the decision in DeCicco v. Schweizer causes a re-examination and an
alteration in the rule applied to unilateral contracts, the same result
will be effected in the case of bilateral contracts.
Such a result will be found to be the correct one, both theoretically
and practically; but, nevertheless, there are important logical dis-
tinctions between the two kinds of cases, and these will now be con-
sidered. In both cases the actual consideration for C's promise is
the performance of an act by A; but in the unilateral case this act
is the performance of service due to B-like the building of a bridge
or the delivery of goods, and in the bilateral case this act is a promise--
an expression of an intention to do other acts in the future, made in
'This was undoubtedly true in the following cases: Bagge v. Slade (16x6)
3 Bulstr. 162; Shadwell v. Shadwell (i86o) 9 C. B. N. S. i59; Abbott v. Doane(1895) 163 Mass. 433; and in the case under present discussion, DeCicco v.
Schweizer. In Schuler v. Myton (1892) 48 Kan. 282, .where the court held the
promise to be unenforceable, it did so with strongly expressed regret, but a
regret that only accentuates the injustice of the decision.
' Langdell, Summary of Contracts, sec. 84; Wald's Pollock, Contracts (Willis-
ton's ed. i9o6) 206-209; 2 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability (i9o6) iii ff.;
Merrick v. Giddings (1882, Dist. Col.) i Mackey, 394, 4U1. This distinction is
referred to by Mr. Justice Cardozo.
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the conventional form used to create obligation. In the one case, A's
act is exactly the same as was required of him by his previous duty
to B. In the other case, the new promissory act is one that was not
required of A by any pre-existing duty. These differences would seem
ample to justify the application of different rules to the two kinds of
contracts, and the enforcement of the bilateral agreement even if the
unilateral one is not enforced. If the unilateral contract is enforceable,
as this article has already attempted to show and as was held in DeCicco
v. Schweizer, it follows-almost a fortiori--that the bilateral contract
should be enforced.
In the unilateral case the act of A, constituting the acceptance and
the consideration, is of such a sort that it cannot give a special right
in personam to C or create a special contractual duty in A. In the
bilateral case the act of A is of such a sort that under ordinary condi-
tions it would create a right in C and a duty in A. Does the fact that
A was under a similar pre-existing duty to B prevent his promise to
C from operating to create this new relationship of right and duty?
A word is necessary at this point in regard to bilateral contracts
in general, in order to anticipate any possible charge of begging the
question. It has been a favorite doctrine with a number of writers
that for any consideration to be legally sufficient it must involve a
detriifient to the promisee. Having laid down this doctrine as a uni-
versal test, it became necessary to explain its application to bilateral
contracts. It was thereupon said that a binding promise was a detri-
ment, at the same time tacitly (and sometimes expressly) admitting
that an unenforceable promise was not a detriment; and this was
said to be the reason why a promise is a sufficient consideration for
a return promise. It is obvious that this is reasoning in a circle. One
promise is binding because the return promise is a detriment to its
maker, and this return promise is a detriment because it is binding.
4
In order to avoid this vicious circle, it is necessary either to show
that any promissory act is in itself sufficiently detrimental to satisfy,
the legal requirement as to consideration, whether it creates a legal
duty or not, or to abandon the detriment theory- of consideration
altogether in the case of bilateral contracts. The first of these alterna-
tives is not at all a hopeless one; but the second one is much to be
preferred over the first. Mutual promises create a legal obligation
because-in English-speaking countries, at least-the customary
nations of honor and well-being cause men to perform as they have
promised, and the lawmaking powers have decreed that in such cases
"Previous discussions of this problem are to be found as follows: Anson,
Contracts (Huffcut's 2d Am. ed. i9o6) sec. 143; Williston, Successive Prom-
ises of the Same Performance (1894) 8 HARv. L. REv. 27, Consideration in
Bilateral Contracts (1914) 27 ibid. 503; Langdell, Mutual Promises as a Con-
sideration (goi) 14 ibid. 496; Ames, Two Theories of Consideration (1899)
13 ibid. 29.
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promise-breakers shall make compensation. Our prevailing credit
system in business requires such a rule. The basis for the enforcement
of bilateral contracts lies in mutual assent and fair dealing.
The fact is that "consideration" is an undefined and nebulous con-
cept. Our efforts at definition have been inharmonious and unsuccess-
ful for the reason that a great variety of facts must be included. This
is an excellent illustration of the general truth that we do not have
universal principles or mechanical rules or clean-cut definitions in
the beginning. It is evident that we have a strong desire for such
universal and mechanical tests so that we can predict societal action
with greater certainty. Therefore, we continually construct exact
definitions and general rules. Some thus "lay down the- law" with
dogmatic vigor, even asserting an a priori necessity, logical or divine.
In all contract law our problem is to determine what facts will
operate to create legal duties and other legal relations. We find at
the outset that bare words of promise do not so operate. Our prob-
lem then becomes one of determining what facts must accompany
promissory words in order to create a legal duty (and other legal
relations). We must know what these facts are in order that we can
properly predict the enforcement of reparation, either specific or com-
pensatory, in case of non-performance. We are looking for a sufficient
cause or reason for the legal enforcement of a promise. This pfoblem
was also before the Roman lawyers, and it must exist in all systems
of law. With us it is called the problem of consideration.
By the common law, the sealing and delivery of a writing are
operative facts sufficient to create a legal duty. We do not call them
"consideration," although to say that a seal imports a consideration 4 a
is next door to saying that a seal is a consideration. But among those
facts that are judicially deemed to be a sufficient reason for the
enforcement of a promise we find a return promise, and it is custom-
arily described as a "consideration." If we are asked why this return
promise is deemed to be a sufficient consideration, the answer is the
same as the answer to the question why various detrimental acts
are deemed to be sufficient. The answer lies in the prevailing notions
of honor and well-being, notions that grow out of ages of experience
in business affairs and in social intercourse. At all events, it is quite
unnecessary to reply that a return promise is a sufficient consideration
because it is a detriment. It is much better to answer: because the
parties have expressed their mutual assent in conventional form.25
'a As used in modern times, this expression is quite erroneous; for a seal is
not evidence of an agreed equivalent and never has been. Those who invented
the expression in the sixteenth century used the term consideration in a much
broader sense so as to include deliberate volition or well-considered intention.
See the argument of Bromley in Sharington v. Strotton (I565, K. B.) i Plow.
298, 3o8a.
' This view of bilateral contracts has been ably maintained in 2 Street, Founda-
tions of Legal Liability (i9o6) ch. r2. See to the same effect W. S. Holdsworth,
Debt, Assumpsit, and Consideration (913) I Micar. L. REV. 347.
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It does not follow from the foregoing that every return promise
is a sufficient consideration, any more than it follows that every detri-
mental act is a sufficient one. Some exact and general rule is, indeed,
desirable as a test of enforceability; but no attempt to formulate such
a rule is necessary for the purposes of this article. Its formulation
would require the analysis and classification of innumerable past cases.
It will be sufficient if we can show that the test ought not to lie in the
existence or non-existence of a duty to a third person. Many courts
have adopted this test, it is true; but it is believed to be arbitrary and
unsatisfactory. The case of DeCicco v. Schweizer shows that the
authorities are not such as to make debate unprofitable At least, it
was not unprofitable to Count Gulinelli.
It should now be clear that the mutual promises of A and C to do
acts not illegal are sufficient to create mutual rights and duties, with-
out calling the promissory acts themselves either detriments or benefits.
Does a pre-existing contract by A with B to perform the very samd
acts prevent such a legal result? One good reason why it should not
prevent such a result is that there is no good reason why it should
prevent it. No public interest will be damaged by giving to the mutual
promises their normal operative legal effect. Instead, the refusal to
enforce such promises gives a moral shock to the community; and
uniformity of rule is in itself advantageous. The public interest here
is the same as in the case of unilateral contracts discussed in the first
part of this article.
In holding that A's new promissory act creates new contractual rela-
tions with C (that is, that the promises are binding), we are no more
begging the question than in the case of any other bilateral contract.
The fact that A's promises to B and C can be fulfilled by his doing
one and the same act does not affect this particular problem in the
least.
It can easily be shown that there is nothing impossible in the idea
of two separate and independent duties in A to perform one act. Let
us suppose a case based upon McDevitt v. Stokes. A has contracted
with B to drive the latter's mare, Grace, in the "Futurity." Later, C
procures A's new promise to drive Grace in this race by paying to
A $i,ooo cash in advance. There can be no question that this is a
valid and enforceable unilateral contract. C's cash is ample con-
sideration for A's promise.26 This being true, if A now fails to drive
in the race as promised, he is bound to pay damages to both B and C.
The right of B and the right of C are wholly independent of each
other, however; likewise, A's correlative duty to B is wholly inde-
pendent of and separate from his correlative duty to C. The fact
"It is immaterial whether A's promise is a valid consideration for the cash
payment (although it would be one) because that payment is executed. The
money no longer belongs to C, so it is certain that he has suffered a detriment.
The money now belongs to A, and it is certain that he has received a benefit
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that A might have satisfied his duty to B and his separate duty to C
by performing one and the same act is quite immaterial and shows
no identity in the legal relations. A's new promise to C is an opera-
tive fact that lays a train of new consequences. It causes non-
performance of the promised act to have new legal effect. The result-
ing duty to compensate C is not the same as his secondary duty to
compensate B; these two duties cannot even be performed by making
one payment.
Furthermore, if A and B now unite in rescinding their original
agreement, this discharges A's' duty to B, but it does not discharge
A's duty to C; neither is this rescission in itself a breach of A's duty
to C. A's new contract with C, absolutely binding though it was,
did not deprive A of either the power or the privilege of joining with
B in a rescission. It deprived him merely of the privilege, in relation
to C, of not driving Grace. Such a rescission, absolutely valid though
"it was, leaves A's duty to C just as it was before; and A's subsequent
failure to drive in the race will still create in C a secondary right todamages. All these facts go to show that A's promise to C has an
operative effect different from that of his promise to B.
In many cases of this sort A's duty to B will be substantially dif-
ferent from his duty to C in another respect. His duty to B may be
expressly or constructively conditional upon some performance by B.
A's duty to B to drive in the race may be conditional upon B's pay-
ment of salary then due and his furnishing of board and lodging.
The new duty to C may not be subject to these conditions. However,
even if A should make his new duty to C expressly subject to the
same conditions-of payment of salary by B, etc.,-the reasons given
above are amply sufficient to show that it is a duty different from that
owed to B. The fact is that a duty is a legal relation between two
persons, and such a relation between A and B is not a relation between
A and C.
Such being the legal relations of the parties in the case of a uni-lateral contract between A and C, where A has promised and C has
paid, there is no impossibility in creating similar legal relations where
the new agreement between A and C is bilateral, A's new duty to C,if created by the law, will be beneficial to C and detrimental to A,just as in the case of other bilateral contracts. Also, A's promissory
act will be just as valuable and effective, per se, as in the case of
other bilateral contracts. The fact that A may now receive a greater
compensation than he would have received had C made no contract
is immaterial. B and C both receive exactly what they desired: each
of them obtains a separate promissory act from A; each also obtains
from A's promised performance exactly the benefit that he expected;
and if we hold that the new agreement is valid, each obtains an enforce-
able legal right against A. On the other hand, A has done wrong to
no man and the public interest has been fully protected.
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The new duty of A to C where C has paid A $i,ooo for his new
promise to drive Grace in the "Futurity" is not a duty not to rescind
his pre-existing contract with B. The same is true where the new
contract between A and C is bilateral. After A has promised C that
he will drive Grace in the "Futurity," he remains privileged, -just
as before, to accept an offer of rescission made to him by B. Such
a rescission by A will be no breach of his promise to C. In spite of
such a rescission, it is still quite possible for A to drive Grace. The only
ways in which A can break his contract with C are to fail to drive
Grace when the day arrives, or to send to C an unconditional anticipa-
tory repudiation. The rescission of the contract with B is neither
of these. This is true even in cases like DeCicco v. Schweizer; for
a mutual rescission by the count and the daughter would be no breach
of a promise by the count to the father. Blanche and the count might
still appear before a magistrate and be married, and this would fulfill
perfectly the count's promise.
2 7
It has been said of bilateral contracts that a promise is a sufficient
consideration in all cases where the performance of the thing promised
would be a sufficient consideration in a unilateral contract.
2 8  Prob-
ably no such test as this was consciously in the minds of the judges
when they first began to enforce bilateral contracts, nor is it ofteti
consciously in the minds of the judges to-day. It may be, however,
that the decided cases can be consistently explained on such 'a theory.
If this is true, the doctrine may now be used to establish the validity
of a bilateral contract between A and C similar to that discussed above.
For, an actual payment by C to A of $i,ooo for A's new promise is
clearly a sufficient consideration and makes A's promise to C a binding
one. Then, by the above doctrine, C's promise of $iooo would like-
wise be a sufficient consideration, irrespective of the content of A's
promise, and A's promise would create a legal duty to C.29 Likewise,
if the attempt in the earlier part of this article was successful to show
that A's performance as required by his previous duty to B is sufficient
consideration for a promise by C, then A's promise of such perform-
ance would be sufficient. The validity of the bilateral contract, how-
ever, need not rest upon this supposed doctrine, but may properly
See in accord, Edmund M. Morgan, Benefit to the Promisor as Consideration
(i9,7) I MINN. L. REV. 383, 391.
1:2 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability (i9o6) i1o: "the promise in question
must appear to be for the doing of some act which if actually performed would
be a good consideration for a binding unilateral promise." Samuel Williston,
Consideration in Bilateral Contracts (1914) 27 H.Auv. L. REv. 518, quoting Leake,
Contracts (1st ed. 1867) .314, and Thorp v. Thorp (i7oi, K. B.) 12 Mod. 455.
" This is vigorously maintained by Sir Frederick Pollock: Wald's Pollock,
Contracts (Williston's ed. i9o6) 2o8. The American editor, however, is unwill-
ing to hold that C's promise to pay $iooo would make A's new promise binding,
in spite of the fact that C's payment would do so.
27
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rest upon the fact that when making the promises the parties con-
template new and different legal relations. The acts of A and C are
sufficient to create contractual relations in the absence of a previous
contract between A and B; and the existence of such a previous
contract is no adequate reason for depriving A and C of their ordinary
powers.
It has been suggested that it is "intrinsically unreasonable" to
make this distinction and to hold that a promise of future performance
may be regarded as better and more effective legally than actual
performance itself.30 The same idea has been expressed in figure
of speech by alleging that a bird in the hand must always be at least
as good as the same bird in the bush.31 The homely answer to this
suggestion is that in the two cases it is not the same bird. In the
bilateral case the new promisor (C) requests and obtains a promissory
act on the part of A-a statement of intention. In the unilateral case,
C requests and obtains certain other action by A, not including any
promise. The law should make no effort to determine the relative
value of these two actions by A. Here, as in other connections, their
value is to be measured by the appetite of C, who is agreeing to pay
for them. It is to be remembered that in both cases it is A's immediate
act that is requested by C as the return for his own promise. In the
bilateral case this act is the immediate promissory act and not the
remote performance of the promise.32  No doubt this remote per-
formance is an object of C's desire; but it is desired only as an
expected consequence of the contract now being made, and generally
as only one of several such consequences. This remote performance
may be known in advance to be very uncertain, just as other desirable
consequences are. This is always true in the case of aleatory contracts.
In such cases the remote performance is neither the requested con-
sideration nor a condition precedent to the duty of the other party.
In no bilateral case is the remote performance the requested equivalent
of C's promise; it is not the "bird" he is buying. The requested
acts in the two cases are known to be different, and the contemplated
legal relations are different also. Whether in these cases we regard
the "bird" as the requested act of A, or as the legal relations resulting
therefrom, it is not the same bird.
In many instances a right to some future performance may be of a
greater market value than is the performance itself. Thus, from the
Samuel Williston, Consideration in Bilateral Contracts (1914) 27 H v. L.
REv. 524. "To hold that it is a better consideration than actual present per-
formance seems extreme"; Wald's Pollock, Contracts (Williston's ed. i9o6)
21o, n.
"3. B. Ames, Two Theories of Consideration (1899) 13 IAv. L. REV. 40;
H. W. Ballantine, Is the Doctrine of Consideration Senseless and Illogical?
(9m3) ii Micn. L. R v. 427.
See Ames, Two Theories of Consideration (I899) 13 HARv. L. RE . 29.
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standpoint of benefit to the defendant, a right to the future delivery
of a white elephant would be in many instances of great value, whereas
by actual delivery he would often have nothing but an elephant on
his hands. In DeCicco v. Schweizer, the defendant might easily dis-
cover that it was far more advantageous socially and financially to
have the promise of a count in the family than to have actual pos-
session and enjoyment of the count in person. From the standpoint
of detriment to the plaintiff, it is equally conceivable that the count
might find a mere engagement promise more detrimental to himself
socially and financially than the final and irrevocable wedding cere-
mony itself. The very irrevocability of the latter makes for recon-
ciliation with parents and for credit with tradesmen.
What the law has been in the past is to be determined solely by the
sum total of its applications in actual cases. What it is to be in the
future depends upon the desire of the community and the opinion of
the courts. The courts strain after consistency, and their opinion
will be swayed by legal theory and logic as well as by precedent. In
future cases agreeing with McDevitt v. Stokes, the plaintiff will find
that his performance as in duty bound to a third person is not a
sufficient consideration. But because of the decision of the New York
Court of Appeals in DeCicco v. Schweizer, a plaintiff in such a case
may be encouraged to hope for a righteous decision in his favor.
